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Abstract In this essay, I defend the interest theory of rights against the argument
that because some agents hold rights grounded in a special role or office, rather
than their own interests, the theory is false. I begin by explaining the interest theory
and the argument from rights attached to roles against it. I then explore responses
to this objection by Kramer and Raz, ultimately rejecting them and proposing a sim-
pler solution of my own. My response stipulates that in cases where people seem
to have rights grounded in a special role, it is actually the state or the society that
holds those rights. Given that the interest theory can allow collective entities to have
rights, this responsemanages to retain the full explanatory power of the original the-
ory, without introducing additional theoretical conditions for agents holding rights.
Based on this, I argue that the argument from rights attached to roles is not sufficient
to refute the interest theory.
1 Introduction
The aim of this essay is to defend the interest theory of rights against the argument
that, because some agents hold rights grounded in a special role or office, the theory
is false. The essay has three sections. In the first section, I explain the interest the-
ory and the argument from rights aĴached to roles against it. In the second section, I
then explore, and ultimately reject, responses to this objection by prominent interest
theorists Kramer and Raz. This is because Kramer’s response limits the explanatory
power of the interest theory too much, whereas Raz’s solution contradicts the original
interest theory and necessitates the addition of new problematic conditions for agents
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holding rights. In the final section, I propose a simpler solution of my own. This solu-
tion stipulates that in cases where people seem to have rights grounded in a special
role, it is actually the state or the society that holds those rights. I argue that this re-
sponse allows us to explain many cases of rights related to special roles that are often
thought to be difficult for the interest theory to accommodate. Given that the interest
theory can allow collective entities to have rights, this response manages to retain the
full explanatory power of the original theory, without introducing additional theoret-
ical layers. Finally, I argue that the idea that collective entities can have rights is not
merely a peculiar feature of the interest theory, but present in many areas of our com-
mon language. Based on this, I conclude that the argument from rights aĴached to
roles is not sufficient to refute the interest theory.
2 The Interest Theory and the Argument from Rights
Attached to Roles
The interest theory is a theory about the normative foundation of rights. For the pur-
poses of this essay, I am trying to avoid asmany additional commitments related to the
definition of rights as possible. Rather, I take “rights” as a basic moral concept which
can be explicated in various ways by different first-order moral and political theories,
similarly to terms like ‘‘duty” or “good”. Although different authors have presented
slightly different formulations of the theory, a simplified version of Kramer’s interest
theory will be sufficient for the purposes of this essay. Paraphrasing Kramer1 2, the
interest theory consists of two main propositions:
1. For X to hold a right, it is necessary, though not sufficient, that the right protects
some aspect of X’s situation that is typically beneficial for a being like X.
2. For X to hold a right, it is neither necessary, nor sufficient, that X is competent to
demand or waive the enforcement of the right.
Proposition 1 states the basic idea of the interest theory, namely that rights exist to
make right-holders beĴer off. For example, because it is verymuch in our interest to not
be physically assaulted, we have a right to bodily integrity. The point of proposition 2,
on the other hand, is tomake the claim that having a right does not depend on the right-
holder having highly developed mental competencies. What is required is simply that
the right-holder has interests, not that they are autonomous, for example. Therefore,
the interest theory entails that the group of potential right-holders is not limited to
1. Kramer, M.H., ”Some Doubts about Alternatives to the Interest Theory of Rights”,’Ethics,vol. 123,
no. 2, (2013): 246.
2. Kramer, M. H., Simmonds, N. E. & Steiner, H., A debate over rights: philosophical enquiries (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1998): 62.
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competent adult humans, but can include any entities that have interests, for example
non-human animals or corporations.
It is important to note that the interest theory does not claim that all interests create
rights: to give an obvious example, even if an aspiring politician has a strong interest
in being elected, it does not follow that they should have a right to be elected regard-
less of their expertise and support among their constituents. This is why having an
interest is a necessary, but not a sufficient condition for having a right. Indeed, the in-
terest theory, as defined above, does not take a stance on what set of conditions would
be sufficient for having a right, allowing the theory to be paired with a variety of moral
views. For example, it seems plausible to say that for an interest to ground a right,
the interest must not involve gratuitously harming others, meaning that the interest
theorist need not be commiĴed to claiming that, say, someone who gets pleasure from
killing dogs must have a right to do so. However, discussing exactly what set of in-
terests and possible other conditions would be sufficient for creating a right is beyond
the scope of this essay. Instead, my aim is to defend a far more limited, but still an
important claim about the source of rights, namely that for every right someone holds,
there is a corresponding interest that the right protects. As we shall see, some philo-
sophers think that there are obvious counterexamples against this claim, which I aim
to refute.
Before moving on, however, it is useful for understanding the interest theory to
briefly think about the positive reasons there are for endorsing it. To begin with, it
seems very intuitive to think that many rights exist because they make us beĴer off. In
addition to the right to bodily integrity, rights such as right to life, right to subsistence
and right to education seem so important namely because they are vital to our welfare.
A related point is that the interest theory conceptually allows there to be unwaivable
rights. For example, interest theorists can maintain that people have the unwaivable
right to not be enslaved because this is always in their interest. On the other hand, the
interest theory is not commiĴed to the claim that our rights alwaysmake us beĴer off in
every instance: for example, asWenar3 points out, inheritancesmight sometimes cause
us more trouble than benefit. This is why proposition 1 in our definition of the interest
theory talks about things that are typically beneficial for beings like the right-holder in
question. Finally, it seems very plausible that beings other than adult humans, such as
infant human children, have at least some important rights. The interest theory has no
difficulty in accommodating this intuition.
Having introduced the interest theory, I will now present the argument from rights
aĴached to roles against it. The idea is simple: contrary to what the interest theory
claims, there seems to be cases where people possess certain rights due to a special role
or office that they hold. An oft-cited example is a judge who has the right to convict
people to years in jail.4 I will reconstruct the argument in standard form as follows:
3. Wenar, L., ”The Nature of Rights”, Philosophy & Public Affairs, vol. 33, no. 3 (2005): 241.
4. Ibid., 242.
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P1 The interest theory maintains that for X to hold a right, it is necessary that the right
protects some aspect of X’s situation that is typically beneficial for a being like X.
P2 The right of a judge to convict people does not protect any aspect of the judge’s
situation that is typically beneficial for humans (i.e. beings like the judge).
C1 It is not necessary for X to hold a right that the right protects some aspect of X’s
situation that is typically beneficial for a being like X.
C2 The interest theory is false.
The argument uses a counterexample to show that proposition 1 fromour definition
of the interest theory, as expressed in P1 in the argument, is false. Because the right of
the judge to convict criminals does not seem to be relevant for any important aspect
of their welfare or other interests - unlike their right to bodily integrity typically is - it
seems impossible that the interests of the judge could give them the right to alter the
situations of other people so dramatically. Instead, the natural interpretation of the
case is that the judge is exercising a right that is not based on their interests. Therefore,
it seems that having an interest is not a necessary condition for holding a right.
3 Responding to the Argument
The argument from rights aĴached to roles has been discussed extensively in the lit-
erature. Since my aim in this essay is to defend the interest theory, I will now look at
some responses that have been offered by prominent interest theorists to see if they
can aid, or at least inform my project. To begin with, Kramer5 responds to the argu-
ment from rights aĴached to roles by maintaining that, in fact, the right of the judge
to convict criminals is not a right at all. According to Kramer, when we talk about
the right of a judge to convict or a head of state to declare war, we are talking about
powers or special capabilities that are simply not the same thing as rights. I find this
solution somewhat intuitive, as I feel that although the same word is commonly used,
the right of a judge to convict criminals is a very different case from ordinary rights that
belong to everyone, such as the right to basic sustenance. Perhaps we should reserve
the concept of right to specific usage and find more suitable terms for the “rights” of
office-bearers.
Still, I think that accepting this response would strip away an important part of
the interest theory’s explanatory power. This is exactly because Kramer’s response
drastically limits the types of rights that the interest theory can accommodate, accept-
ing only claims as actual rights and leaving out all other Hohfeldian incidents, namely
5. Kramer, M.H., Simmonds, N.E. & Steiner, H., A debate over rights: philosophical enquiries, 9-10.
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privileges, powers and immunities.6 I find that a beĴer way to account for the sense
of important difference between the judge and someone’s right to bodily integrity is
to say that the judge holds a power-right to convict, whereas we all hold claim-rights
against bodily aĴacks. The difference here is, roughly, that the judge has a right to
alter other people’s (claim-)rights (in this case, the convicted person’s right to liberty),
whereas our right to bodily integrity just means that others have a duty not to aĴack
us. While it is not the purpose of this essay to dwell deep intoHohfeld’s terminology, it
should nevertheless be clear that not being able to accommodatemany of the common-
sense ways we refer to rights in our language is a flaw for a theory seeking to explain
them. Of course, this flaw could be rectified with a convincing positive argument for
why we should understand rights exactly in the way Kramer suggests, but with no
such argument in sight, I think it is best to keep refraining from additional normative
assumptions regarding the exact nature of rights.
At first glance, I find that Raz7 offers a more promising solution. He holds that
rights are not always fundamentally grounded on the personal interest of the right-
holder. Sometimes an interest can be instrumentally valuable because it promotes the
welfare of others. For example, while it is true that the right of a judge to convict crim-
inals cannot be grounded on the judge’s personal interests, this right can be justified by
appealing to the interests of the population in general. Here, the judge has an interest
in being able to do their work, but this interest is sufficient to create rights only because
it promotes safety, and as such is instrumentally valuable to other moral agents living
in the society. Raz’ own example is a journalist, whose right to protect the identity of
their sources is ultimately justified because of its value to the public.8
However, Kamm9 has pointed out that Raz’ argument contradicts the interest the-
ory as it is commonly defined. From our point of view, it is fairly clear why this is: if
it is not the interests of the judge, but those of someone else, that give the judge their
power-rights, then proposition 1 in our definition of the interest theory is false. This
is because it is no longer necessary for X to have a right that this right protects some
aspect of namely X’s own situation. To make the interest theory compatible with Raz’
solution, our definition would have to be modified like this:
1.* For X to hold a right, it is necessary, though not sufficient, that the right protects
some aspect of X’s situation that is either a) typically beneficial for a being like X
or b) benefits a large enough group of other morally significant beings.
It is important to unpack this definition carefully. What is proposed here is that
while it is still X that holds the right, this right need not be grounded in X’s interests.
6. Hohfeld, W.N., ”Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning”, Yale Law
Journal,vol. 23, no. 1 (1913): 28-58.
7. Raz, J., The morality of freedom (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988): 178-190.
8. Ibid., 179.
9. Kamm , F., “Rights” in The Oxford handbook of jurisprudence and philosophy of law, ed. Coleman, J.L.
& Shapiro, S. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004): 485.
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Instead, X can hold a right that protects the interests of [Y, Z. . . N]. For example, the
journalist’s right to protect the identity of their sources in Raz’ example is still a right
that the journalist holds personally, but the moral grounding of this right is in the
interests of other people. This represents a major change compared to the original
interest theory, where agents can only hold rights grounded on interests that they hold
themselves.
The fact that this modification changes the interest theory substantially leads to
some issues. Firstly, it seems that the added part b) of the proposition effectively al-
lows consequentialist considerations to create rights. If one believes that consequen-
tialist calculations are an inappropriate or even impermissible way of arriving at moral
judgements, then this might be a fatal flaw in itself. However, even if we allow our
moral theory to assign some value to consequences, this formulation of the interest the-
ory clashes with many people’s intuitions of rights, as rights are usually considered in
some sense unalterable, meaning that they cannot be erased whenever an individual’s
rights clash with the interests of the majority. Secondly, it is also not clear which of
the two functions that rights can serve in the revised interest theory should take pri-
ority if they contradict each other. For example, it can definitely be in a rich person’s
interests to have strong property rights, whereas the public benefit might require that
the state has the right to tax its citizens. These kinds of evaluative problems are of
course present in the original interest theory but adding multiple functions that rights
can fulfil makes them even more difficult. Finally, even if we managed to solve these
problems, this solution adds theoretical layers into the interest theory, making it less
parsimonious. Therefore, it seems that this solution is, after all, only a minor improve-
ment to Kramer’s response.
4 Collective Entities as Right-Bearers
Despite these problems, I find that there is something correct about the idea that the
public interest can ground rights. Therefore, I will now try to develop this idea. To
tackle the objection from rights related to office, while avoiding the problems described
in the preceding section, I think a supporter of the interest theory should go back to
the fundamental properties of their theory. Here, I believe that the interest theorist
can make use of the fact that the interest theory does not limit the group of potential
right-holders to adult humans, but can also include entities like corporations or states.
In cases like the judge example, the interest theorist could simply say that it is the state
that holds the right to convict criminals, rather than the judge. The judge is merely
a tool that follows carefully defined rules, allowing the state to exercise its right to
punish people who harm it. This simple solution can still accommodate all Hohfeldian
incidents and, unlike Raz’ idea, it does not require that we change proposition 1 of our
definition of the interest theory. This is because unlike in Raz’ solution, we do not
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claim that the judge holds any power-rights at all, meaning that we need not justify
the rights of one agent by the interests of someone else. Instead, both the right-holder
and the interest-holder, in this particular case, is the state. It is not the case that X can
hold rights grounded in the interests of [Y, Z. . . N] but, instead, X simply is [Y, Z. . . N].
To see whether my suggestion seems plausible, we can try to apply it to some other
cases. To begin with, I think we can say something along my line of thought about the
journalist protecting their sources. It seems plausible to me that, in fact, the journalist
does not have a right to protect their sources, but a duty to do that. Consequently,
we can analyse the case as an instance of the civil society as a whole having a claim-
right that creates this duty. If the journalist would harm the civil society by naming
their sources, then it is conceivable that the civil society has a right against this kind
of harming. In this vein, it seems like most arguments that at first seem to make ref-
erences to multiple other people’s interests as a way to justify someone’s rights could
be phrased in terms of collective entities, by simply identifying the collective that the
interest-holders form. Nevertheless, there still remains some difficult cases where it
seems like someone holding a special role has the right to act against the interests of
the relevant collective. For example, consider a head of state who has a constitutional
right to order a nuclear aĴack, and consequently could do this because of a personal
whim, even if it was against the national interest. However, I think it is clear that even
if this head of state would have the legal right to order the aĴack, they would not have
the moral right to do so. In fact, in this case, I hold that the nation would have a moral
right against the head of state ordering nuclear aĴack. There is nothing peculiar here:
since the interest theory is a theory of moral rights, there will be cases where the legal
rights of certain office-bearers clash with the moral rights of both individuals and col-
lectives. Making this distinction allows us to explain why it can sometimes seem as if
certain office-bearers have the “right” to act in ways that are against everyone else’s
interests, even though this is not the case in so far as we are concerned with morality
rather than the leĴer of the law.
Having established that my proposal can make sense of many situations that are
usually considered difficult for the interest theory to accommodate, I wish to address
onemore possible objection tomyview. I believe one couldmake variousmetaphysical
arguments aimed at establishing that the kind of collective entities that I refer to do not
really exist, and therefore, my view is not sound. As a pre-emptive, though imperfect,
rejoinder to this class of objections, I would like to point out that we already seem to
accept, in many areas of life and our common language, that many kinds of collective
entities can hold rights. A paradigm example of this is a corporation with copyright to
intellectual property. Moreover, in international law, there are references to rights of
states,10 and in the age of climate change, more andmore references are made to rights
10. See e.g. Brown, P.M., “The Rights of States under International Law”, Yale Law Journal, vol. 26,
no. 2 (1916).
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of future generations.11 Of course, this does not prove that collective rights exist, in the
sameway that the fact thatwe can talk about dragons does notmean that dragons exist.
However, given the intelligibility and common occurrence of the idea that collective
entities can have rights, I hold that even my dialectic opponent should grant that this
idea seems initially plausible. Therefore, the burdenwould be on them to explainwhat
goes wrong when we talk about collective rights and why these rights do not really
exist. It is also true that deciding exactly what kind of rights, if any, a certain group
should have and how these rights should weigh against rights of others is a difficult
question, but this does not undermine the general idea that collective entities can hold
rights.
5 Conclusion
In this essay, I have defended the interest theory from the argument from rights at-
tached to roles. I began by introducing the interest theory and the argument against it,
before reviewing two responses by prominent interest theorists Kramer and Raz. In-
stead of endorsing either of them, however, I argued that we can beĴer respond to the
argument by stating that it is actually the state or the society that holds the rights we
often erroneously aĴribute to office-bearers. This response has the benefit of retaining
the interest theory’s explanatory power across all Hohfeldian incidents and avoiding
a collapse to utilitarianism, without having to introduce additional theoretical con-
ditions in it. After all, it is a central feature of the interest theory that the group of
potential right-holders is not limited to individuals, but can include collective entities.
We also saw that my solution can successfully explain many cases where agents seem
to have rights grounded in holding certain roles, as well as allowing us to say what
is wrong with cases where office-bearers seem to have a right to act against everyone
else’s interests. Finally, I pointed out that the idea that collective entities can hold rights
is not confined to the literature regarding the interest theory, but instead, can be found
in our common language from many areas of life. This observation lends further sup-
port for the plausibility of my view against those who are sceptical of the existence of
the collective entities I refer to. Therefore, I conclude that the argument from rights
aĴached to roles is not sufficient to refute the interest theory.
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